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STATINTL

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FILE *O T 1*

DD/S 70-2760

7 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Director's State of the Agency Message

Jack:

You will recall that I advised the DCI at the Executive Committee Meeting the other day that the transcript of his State of the Agency Message was available for his review. He asked that your Staff edit his speech. After you have done so please return to me and I will place it in the Agency archives.


*RLB*  
R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Att

DD/S:RLB:llc (6 July 1970)

Distribution:

- Addressee
- DD/S Chrono
- DD/S Subject



*Fraser*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms

Attached is a transcript of your State-of-the-Agency Message on 19 June 1970. Other than ~~any~~ record copy no other copies have been produced pending your decision as to ~~the printing of~~ <sup>as per</sup> *whether you wish* ~~printed~~ this speech for Agency distribution.

The film of your speech has just been delivered and runs for 35 minutes. It is quite good. It is available for your viewing any time at your convenience. I think the film conveys your message much better than the printed text and would recommend your approval to show it to Agency employees.

For control purposes I recommend we classify the film *as desired* <sup>THEIR</sup> *AND THE TRANSCRIPT* "Confidential" to ensure ~~its~~ control within Agency premises.

R. L. Bannerman

Att: Transcript of Speech

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1970

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The suggestion for the meeting this morning came a few weeks ago from something that is known as the Management Advisory Group which is not an organization but a grouping of a dozen individuals from the Agency who come from various offices and Directorates and who sit together with the thought in mind that they could come up with some suggestions and recommendations which would help us in the management of the Agency. One of their suggestions was that I make sort of a state of the Agency presentation; the thought being that a lot of people on the outside knew more about what was going on in the life of the Agency than people inside. I find this hard to believe but knowing what the grapevine around the organization is; but nevertheless it did seem to me like a good idea to do this from time to time and this is what I intend to carry out. I want this to be quite informal. I had rather planned that I would speak for a while and then I would take questions from the floor. But in the last ten minutes that's been changed because I've been asked to come down to the White House and I'm going to have to leave at 11 o'clock. I can keep the President waiting 20 minutes but not indefinitely.

What I did in trying to get the topics that I thought you would be interested in hearing about this morning was to ask that the Deputies and various others submit their lists. These have been consolidated and the items that appeared most frequently are the ones on my list today. Now I submitted evidence that on such subjects as policy and budgetary squeeze and the future and all the rest of it that I'm bound to oversimplify and I'm bound to leave unanswered a lot of questions that you may have and about that I'm sorry. But I do intend to come back and have these meetings on other occasions. And under those circumstances

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maybe over a period of time we can handle a lot of these things which are on your mind and which would not possibly have occurred to me.

First off, there is obviously a lot of interest in budgetary constraints. It is clear to everyone that the U. S. budget has gotten enormous; that something is going to have to be done about it; that there's a vast preoccupation in this country with our domestic problems and the possible solutions thereto; and that there's a tendency for the American people to look inward rather than outward; and what is the effect of this on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Well, obviously with the money shorter and harder to come by we're going to come in for cuts in our requirements. I don't think there's any doubt about that. But I don't think that this is any reason for us to feel that the ~~road~~<sup>world</sup> is coming to an end and that we can't survive. I have always felt, and I know many disagree with me so that this has to be a personal view, that this Agency can do its work and handle its affairs with an organization that is even smaller than the one we have now, that the answer to the intelligence business is its people, their high quality, not their numbers, and that the direction of this Agency should consistently be to try and keep itself manageable and at the same time with very high competence.

Now you know it's perfectly natural that in any large bureaucracy people pay attention to the ones who are working for them. A Cabinet Minister, obviously, he makes out the fitness reports and pays certain people in his organization and as a result of this he wants to accept their work and use their work and push them along. This is the most natural thing in human life.

How does that apply to the Central Intelligence Agency? It simply applies

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to us in this fashion. That the papers that we produce have got to be better than are produced by any other organization in town or we're going to be out of business. Nobody looks to a third agency to get a piece of information or to get an analysis or an assessment or an estimate unless they have reason to believe that that is going to be better than they can get from their own organization. This alone makes it absolutely fundamental that we keep a high level of performance and that our work as it circulates around town shows this high level of performance.

In addition, we have got to maintain the objectivity and the integrity of our product--a reputation we've established but one which we must maintain. About this there is absolutely no question. This Agency depends and the only constituency it has is on bipartisan support in the Congress and the Presidency, those two power sources. We can't go to the country and we can't write letters to the editor and we can't get a groundswell of human emotion behind the Central Intelligence Agency. You all know that very well. But as long as we are doing our job and doing it professionally and doing it objectively, I think you have no reason to be concerned about the central intelligence concept. It will survive.

In the Senate these days, for example, in the whole spectrum from those that you might describe as very liberal to those you might describe as very conservative we do have a reputation for objectivity. They've had a taste for this now; they know they can get it when they call us down. This is important to them. And therefore if we can maintain this, as I believe we can, then we'll have the support that we need to continue our work.

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it's going to be heavy going. It wouldn't be truthful of me to stand up here and sort of wave my hands and say that all's perfect in the ideal world or anything of that kind. Of course we're going to get cuts and we may have a rough time of it. But I don't think that's something that we need to get unduly concerned about. And above all, I assure you there's powerless little we can do about it. And one of the things in this life, it seems to me, that's rather pointless is to get ulcers over something you can't effect. We can effect it up to a point but not very much. But I would predict that we will get our share.

I'd now like to turn to this question which comes up so frequently about the policy making in the Government and the Agency's role in policy making. I suppose this has been most recently on people's minds in connection with the President's decision to go into Cambodia or into the Cambodian sanctuaries. Before I talk about the Agency's role in these decisions, I would like to get back to first principles if I may and if you think in saying what I'm about to say that I am talking down to you, I am certainly not doing any such thing. I simply have found that the most sophisticated and educated people in this country simply don't understand the United States Government's policy making process. Therefore I would like to describe it to you very briefly but based on my personal observations under three Presidents.

Under our Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and he also makes foreign policy. PERIOD. Now this is his right as an individual and as a human being. It is not the right of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence or of anybody in this room. So where that man seeks his advice and how he puts

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that advice together into a given decision is almost never known except to him.

Presidents almost never make decisions in National Security Council meetings or in open meetings of any kind, even as restricted as that. They usually say that they've heard all the arguments and thank you very much they'll think it over. And then at some point in time the decision emerges. It may be the decision you thought it was going to be; it may be something quite different. But in the process of this, no one knows exactly how many other people have talked to the President on this matter. He may have called several Senators on the telephone; he may have talked to some Congressmen; he may have talked to religious leaders in the Middle West; he may have gotten a group of black leaders in from the South; he may have talked to his wife; he might have talked to his daughter; he may have gone to some old friend of his that he went to college with and said what's your view of this. I don't mean this to sound silly; I simply mean it to indicate that what the Presidential decision usually ends up by being is some strange calculus or chemistry in his mind which emerges in this form based on all the things that he has put into his mental computer.

I find that most of the newspapermen in this town are constantly striving to find out who influenced the President most on decision A and they go to vast pains to try and find this out. As though there was some particular relevance. Because if Mr. A had the influence in decision A, it may well be Mr. B who has the influence in decision B, and therefore the standing of Mr. A in the case of B decision may be zero whereas it was 90% in the case of decision A.

Now this I wish you would <sup>all</sup> take as fact. This is indeed the way it happens.

And power in our Cabinet, in contradistinction to the British Parliamentary system,

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derives from the President. Any Cabinet officer has strength or weakness on any given day depending upon how he relates to the President and how the flow of Presidential power goes through him into the apparatus over which he presides. Dean Rusk described this very well in a very short couple of squibbs he had in Life magazine a couple of years ago. I think the article was totally overlooked because it was written in a kind of shorthand and it was in the back of the magazine and I don't think people paid much attention to it and if they did I don't think they knew what they were reading. But he does describe this process very accurately and this is indeed the way it works.

Now we come back to any decision like the Cambodian decision, obviously the President seeks advice from those people whom he thinks can make a contribution. Sometimes he talks to them privately; sometimes he talks to them in groups. Sometimes he talks to them on the telephone; sometimes he talks to them face to face. There've been questions in connection with Cambodia having to do with the extent to which the problem was thought through, were the domestic implications carefully considered, was this done that done or the other done. As nearly as I can establish, I think they were. Certainly as far as the domestic side of this is concerned, this Agency or its Director has no role in that. And if you sometime would like to have an interesting experience, you might just try to advise the President about domestic opinion. I mean the advice lasts about five seconds and then you've gotten the first three or four words out, and then there's either a stoney look or a pretty quick reply, just like that, that you can just mind your own business. Once the President has been elected, he figures he knows about domestic/political opinion. Maybe he doesn't anticipate a Kent

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State or something of this kind; maybe that didn't get into his computer--I don't know. But I would just say that there's a limitation to the role that each individual among his advisors can and should play.

As far as the intelligence inputs were concerned, I have no policy making role. I don't attempt a policy making role. I attempt to answer the questions I'm asked based on the information I'm given by the analysts in the Agency. I know that recently I've been criticized by some of them because on one occasion when I was going down for a briefing in one of the Congressional committees I had two or three pages of text on Cambodia that I didn't think I could read or convey to this group and I asked to have it rewritten and it was done in a very short time-frame and some of the people involved in the substance of this disagreed about what I should have said. And since then I know in some quarters I've been accused of only supporting the Administration's positions. Well, this is certainly not true. I have not done any such thing. And if it would give any solace to those who are concerned about it, I never used either text. The subject never came up.

Another matter which I know bothers many people, particularly in the Clansdestine Service, has to do with the priority which seems to be given these days to technical collection. This Agency pioneered in overhead reconnaissance. Individuals who have worked for or still do work for the Agency deserve more credit in this field than individuals in any other part of this Government in any previous Administration. We have been in the vanguard of this, considerable imagination has been used and shown. Just today another type of satellite has gone into the far out reaches of space. If it works, it'll be the most modern, sophisticated bird that has ever flown. We hope it will; so far, so good. Let

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me just say that when one looks at this gadget, and I can only call it that, Rube Goldberg in his palmiest days never could have contrived anything like this. And like some of Rube Goldberg's arrangements, it may just work and the coffee bean that you put in this end may come out coffee on that end.

In any event, technical collection in the last ten years has come on enormously. It has given us vast amounts of information about the Soviet Union and Communist China and it's a very important part of intelligence collection these days. About this there is no doubt. Equally, there is no doubt that human intelligence collection is not going out of style, is not going out of fashion, and becomes even more important with each passing day. We can't get any information about the intentions of the other fellow through satellites or cameras or sensors or listening devices, or very little. We have a very hard time finding out about his research and development programs through these devices--perhaps the development programs but not the research programs. And we're still lacking some very important information about the Soviet Union and particularly Communist China which lies in these fields of what goes on in the human mind and what human beings intend to do. So I can assure those in the Clandestine Service who are concerned about this that (a) they're not going to be out of business, (b) the important thing is that they get on with the job better.

I think that I'd like to skip over another point I was going to make which is the discussion of the Agency's relationships with the Administration, the Congress, and so forth. I'll be glad to discuss that at another time. I've touched on the one relevant point a few minutes ago when I discussed the importance of Congressional support and what I believe to be our standing in Congress now. And I don't think that this is something on which I ought to use up any more time. I'd like to get over

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onto another type of consideration which has to do with some of the allegations which get thrown around about the Agency which I wouldn't have thought would be of much concern to at least the people that worked in it, possibly their families. But let me set the record straight on a few points here so this will be done once and for all.

First, the CIA had nothing but nothing whatever to do with Sihanouk's downfall in Cambodia. We didn't even have a CIA staff member in Cambodia. Senator Mansfield who was a friend of President Sihanouk made an arrangement with Sihanouk at the time that we resumed diplomatic relations that we would accede to his wish that there be no CIA people in Cambodia since he distrusted them. Like a lot of other things in this life, he obviously made a mistake. If there'd been somebody there, we might have counseled a different kind of action or moderation. I know not. But I simply say in this life that you can be awfully smart and awfully wrong at the same time.

Second point. I know in the country there's a lot of feeling about the ABM system and whether the United States should have one, commonly known as Safeguard. I know there's been a lot of material in the press back and forth about the Agency's position versus Secretary Laird's position, and so on. Let me just say this. Secretary Laird and I work from the same basic material, the same raw material, the same statistics, facts, whatever you want to call them--intelligence information. But he is Secretary of Defense and I am Director of Central Intelligence and these are two very different jobs. Now as Secretary of Defense he has the responsibility for defending the United States of America. I do not. I have a responsibility for conveying certain information, assessing it, passing it on to those people who

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advise the President on what should be done, and their interpretations of it they're entitled to have. They have always had them; I'm sure they will continue to have them. I don't think therefore that anybody in this room or anybody in the Agency needs to be distressed about these newspaper stories. They simply derive out of the desire of most journalists to have a story to write and if you can have a fight between two people then it makes a better story. This is a simple aspect of journalism that everybody recognizes, including the journalists themselves. To say that Laird and Helms agree is hardly a story. To say that Laird and Helms hardly are speaking these days because of their violent disagreement can get on the front page of the New York Times.

The third is SALT. There has been a lot of backing and forthing about the Agency's position on SALT. I don't know exactly whence this derived. I do know that we have contributed to all the deliberations leading up to the SALT negotiations, that we have worked on the various working groups and panels, that we have contributed everything we know how to contribute particularly the subject of what is known as verification. If a SALT agreement is reached, it's going to be up to us to verify that agreement as best we can through the various intelligence collection devices which we have at our disposal. And in this way we are going to have a particularly critical intelligence function. In short, a SALT agreement is going to make more work for the Agency and more important work, not less.

The disagreements that fly around town on the subject of verification derive in large measure out of different assessments of what can specifically be verified and what cannot. And there's a lot of emotion and passion in this as there is in a lot of things these days. Voices get very shrill. Hearts pound. Adrenalin runs.

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Tables are hammered. Not that this necessarily gets the cause forward but because there are people around who feel that they are--came down on a beam of light from heaven to advise the rest of the world as to which direction mankind should go.

But I see nothing wrong with the position that we've had in these matters, particularly on this SALT thing, I think we've made a substantial contribution to it. I think we've made a very realistic contribution. I think the American positions are in good shape these days and rational and sensible ones. And I think as of this point we have no cause to be concerned particularly.

The last two things have to do with the My Lai massacre and the Garrison allegations.

The Agency had nothing to do with the My Lai massacre--either in an intelligence way, an informational way, an operational way, a military way, a political way, or a psychological way. We didn't even know and none of our people knew that it had even happened or occurred. This was not our bag. We had nothing whatever to do with it and I just would like to leave it there. And this includes General Cushman who was in command at the time in Da Nang and to whom this whole episode was never reported.

As far as the Garrison allegations are concerned, these reiterated charges that the Agency was responsible for killing President Kennedy or a conspiracy to kill him or connived with the FBI to hide information, and so forth, is absolute rubbish. This Agency did everything possible it could to cooperate with the Warren Commission when it made its report. We wrote endless papers, conducted endless investigations, had our hands thoroughly on the table; and there isn't one word of truth in these allegations. And if you, like a lot of people from

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Louisiana, suddenly look up at me and say but then how could the man possibly say these things, I would answer you and say, I don't know.

Another thing that seems to have come up in recent times, and I don't know how these groundswells get started, is that with the retirement program--early retirement program--there seems to be a feeling that one day the present management of the Agency is going to leave the field and others are going to take over and that this is going to cause a, quote, leadership crisis, unquote. God, I would think you'd be glad to get rid of us. I have absolutely no feeling about leadership crisis whatever. I would hope that the Agency was going to be better led in the future than it has been in the past. I would hope that as a result of the experience that many of you have had growing up in this Agency, growing up in this work, getting the scars on your back for jobs done not jobs avoided, that <sup>in</sup> the future we would have maybe a cooler, more sophisticated, and tougher leadership than we've had in the past. I certainly hope so. But I can assure you I'm not spending one minute of my time worrying about the leadership crisis. Somebody will come along.

In this general connection, I did want to speak a little bit in just a moment here about some of the benefits and services available to the Agency employees and their families. I assume you know about these. But nevertheless I think it would be worth taking a moment to run over some of them so that we're all square about it.

The Agency has developed over the years what I honestly believe is as good a program of its kind as exists in the Federal Government. There are those who say it's the finest. I happen to believe these days that the elocution of this

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country has become so shrill and so full of hyperbole that I would like to bring mine down to something that I can stand by. I believe it to be a good program.

Let's take our insurance program, for example. Our own hospitalization plan is unique in that it is tailored to our experience and needs. It offers comparable benefits at a cost lower than our major competitor's and most importantly claims are processed by Agency personnel who provide a quicker and more judicious settlement than is frequently the case when dealing directly with the companies. In May of this year the Agency's term life insurance benefit ~~should be 30% (Xed)~~ increased 80% at no additional cost, so that \$15 per month now purchases \$36,000 of insurance. The \$3,000 insurance for each eligible dependent is an improvement of 300% over the previous limit, again at no extra cost.

The Educational Aid Fund was created to respond, at least in part, to another employee need--to assist deserving children of Agency employees in meeting some of the costs of a college education. In 1969 the Fund received 86 requests for financial aid and was able to award 34 grants of \$500 each. This helped, of course, but we need to do more and we are now in the initial stages of deciding how to go about seeking to raise at least \$500,000 from private donations. Such a financial base would enable the Fund to increase the number of grants as well as the value of each grant.

The Employee Activity Association exists to provide employees with the opportunity to participate in a variety of clubs and associations. Approximately 5,600 employees now participate in 45 recreational clubs, have access to EAA's ticket service which accounted for \$64,000 in ticket sales in 1969 alone, and may purchase in the EAA store various kinds of merchandise at discounts ranging up

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to 40%.

The Agency's Public Service Aid Society is an institution to which employees gravely in need of financial help can turn for both counseling and assistance. At the present time over \$100,000 is on loan without interest to 112 employees who had exhausted all other means of assistance and who confronted acute personal problems such as sudden death in the family or extraordinary medical bills.

Many of you are familiar with the scope and nature of assistance rendered in our retirement activity. The Agency's pre-retirement counseling program was a pioneering effort in this field and preceded by several years the Civil Service Commission's program. We make every effort to support and counsel the prospective retiree, not only in preparing him for the inevitability of retirement but also to permit him to retire with security and with confidence in his future.

I doubt that many of you realize the amount of time the Agency spends daily in providing compassionate assistance to employees and their dependents. Representatives of the Office of Security, Medical Services, and Personnel are on call around the clock to respond to Agency employees and their dependents who have problems. 400 calls per month are received on the Agency's emergency security telephone extension, 6161, and they include such difficulties as urgent medical problems, missing persons, encounters with the police, critical need for funds, use of dangerous drugs, and overseas employee emergencies. Since July of last year the Office of Medical Services has offered to Agency employees an expanded program of consultative services. These include such specialties as internal medicine, psychiatry, and clinical and vocational psychology. Any employee may, by virtue of a simple telephone call, arrange for the use of these services.

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The need for such consultation may arrive from the employee's health -- arise from the employee's health, a family medical or emotional problem, difficulties in job adjustment, or any matter in which the professional competence available in the Office of Medical Services may be of assistance.

There are, of course, other such programs which time does not permit me to enumerate. And in any case, no simple listing adequately communicates what I believe to be the central message intrinsic to all of these services; that is, they are a consequence of the collegial spirit which abides in our organization and the deep professional and personal concern which our employees have for one another.

I realize that I've rambled a bit this morning. As I said at the outset, I'm sorry we don't have, or I don't have the time for the questions that I wanted to have from the floor. But in light of that, we'll try and set up another meeting like this, or something like it, early on and in the course of this maybe I'll just answer questions rather than giving any remarks at all.

I hope I've covered some of the subjects this morning in which you're interested. I know that this country is keenly aware of the problems that it faces and the unease that many of our citizens have about it. I must say that when I read editorials saying the great problems which are tearing our nation apart, I worry about the English. I don't imagine the problems are tearing the country apart, I imagine it's disagreement about the solutions to the problems or something of this kind that's tearing the country apart.

But we have a very glib way, I'm afraid, these days of trying to deal with things and I find this as distressing as anything.

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But in the world of intelligence and in this organization we don't have to be subject to all of the illnesses, if you want to put it that way, of our society. There's no doubt that the world of the 1970's is going to put us all to the test. I'm sure it's not going to be a test of survival; we'll survive. Mankind is going to survive. But he's not going to do it without working and without working hard at it. Problems of his environment are far more troublesome as the years go by than the worries about the atomic bomb and whether we're going to be blown up and whether the ICBM has really stalemated existence as we know it. I don't put any credence in that at all. I think man can hack it. What disturbs me is how hard is he prepared to work at it.

Our problem is to face the life that we've got in front of us and stop groaning about what it might be or what it ought to be. Changes have got to be made. It seems to me that's abundantly clear. But they're certainly not going to be made in an atmosphere of emotion and passion and people running around the streets blowing things up and activities of this kind. I'm saying this to you because I believe that the CIA by and large presents a cool, objective, and reasoned voice in Washington. And I would like it to stay that way. Certainly escapism and hand-wringing and apocalyptic language are going to get us nowhere. They avail no one of anything.

Please ponder that.

Please let's stay on our course.

Please let's not get over-excited and over-swayed by the cross-currents of life in the world today. There is a reasonable course, a reasoned course. And let's us set a good example by staying on it.

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FILE

*OJM*

18 June 1970

NOTES ON "STATE OF THE AGENCY" ARRANGEMENTS

1. The cameras will be located behind the last row of seats in order to reduce the "top of the head" angle. They operate so silently that noise will not be apparent even to people in the rear of the auditorium. Two cameras are necessary since each film pack will cover only thirty minutes. The right-hand camera as you face it will cover the initial period and the left-hand camera the final portion.
2. Except for Colonel White, the Deputies and other most senior officials will be seated in the rear center of the auditorium.
3. The throat microphone is necessary to get a proper recording for film and tape purposes. The two microphones permanently mounted on the lectern will be amplified for the audience and for your hearing of your own voice.
4. In order to get the questions on the sound track and tape and to ensure that all in the auditorium hear them, please repeat each question before answering it.
5. In case you need to clear your throat, there will be a carafe of water and a glass on a small table behind the lectern. It is out of sight of the camera and close enough to avoid your having to go any distance with the throat microphone on.
6. It is necessary to cut the air blowers completely in order to have a good recording. To compensate, but to avoid overheating prior to 1130 hours, the temperature as people come into the auditorium will be at or a bit below 65 degrees. It is estimated that the temperature will rise at least ten degrees during the hour.

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DD/S 70-2232

8 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : The Director's State of the Agency Message

Colonel White:

There appears to be some genuine worry among Agency personnel about the role of the Agency and the U. S. Government in Southeast Asia in the face of reaction and broadening of difficulties on the U. S. domestic scene. As I understand it, the worry is reflected more in the younger personnel and the move into Cambodia has sharpened this worry, presumably in the same manner it has worried a number of U. S. citizens in the public scene. In a non-challenging and in a sincerely loyal way, some questions are being raised orally on this matter and there are some employees who may be considering putting their concerns on paper with a view to seeking clarification from senior Agency management. I would assume that most of these employees are not privy to the highly controlled information on the current action in Southeast Asia and the absence of knowledge, except as they see in the newspapers, is probably stimulating and heightening their concern. As a further description of this matter and stated somewhat differently, some of these officers worry a bit about their relationship as intelligence officers interested in foreign affairs with their concerns as citizens interested in the domestic scene. I do not think they are challenging the issue but they are merely seeking some reassurance on a subject that is troubling many people in the American scene.

While it is recognized that information concerning [redacted] is rather sensitive, it might be helpful and reassuring if the Director could speak in some degree to this subject in his State of the Agency Message. A voluntary statement to break the "silence" would be a welcome example to the employees of the desire of senior management to acquaint them with our part in matters of intense national concern.

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WJ*

[redacted]  
R. L. Bannerman

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